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If It Smells Funny, Don't Eat It:
An Example of the Controversy Surrounding
Genetically Engineered Food Labeling Laws
Diana Milbourn*
Many states have made efforts to regulate the production and sale of
genetically engineered (GE) foods.' This has not only resulted in inconsis-
tency among the states, but has also created controversy as each state ap-
proaches the issue without any detailed guidance from the federal
government. 2 As such, independent attempts to regulate GE foods may
"smell funny"-in other words, they may look good, but are not quite right.
This note examines one recent case in Vermont that highlights the struggles
with enforceability and constitutionality of a state's attempt to regulate GE
foods.
In Vermont, multiple food trade associations sued various government
officials, including the state Attorney General, challenging the constitutional-
ity of a newly signed state statute, Act 120.3 Act 120 requires that certain
manufacturers and retailers identify whether raw and processed food sold in
Vermont is produced through genetic engineering and prohibits manufactur-
ers from labeling or advertising GE foods as "natural."4 Defendants moved to
dismiss Plaintiffs' claims for failure to state a claim upon which relief may
be granted,5 while Plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction to stop en-
forcement of the newly signed law.6 The District Court partially granted and
partially denied Defendants' motions to dismiss, ultimately summarily dis-
missed three out of the five claims pled by Plaintiffs.7 The court's opinion
may be considered lengthy, but both the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure8
and the Plaintiffs' pleading limited its scope.9 As a result, the opinion fails to
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1. THOMSON REUTERS, Genetically Modified Food, 0070 SURVEYS 1 (2015).
2. See id.
3. Grocery Mfrs. Ass'n v. Sorrell, 102 F. Supp. 3d 583, 593 (D. Vt. 2015); 2014
Vt. Acts & Resolves No. 120 (codified as VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 3043
(2015)).
4. § 3043(c).
5. Grocery Mfrs. Ass'n, 102 F. Supp. 3d at 593.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 610.
8. See id. at 598-99.
9. See id. at 599.
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explore significant consequences that may lurk beneath the enforcement of
statutes such as Act 120.
Act 120 and similar state regulations are especially controversial consid-
ering the recent passage of a U.S. House of Representatives proposal (H.R.
1599) that blocks any mandatory labeling of GE foods and will completely
preempt Act 120 if it passes the Senate.1o H.R. 1599 is called the "Safe and
Accurate Food Labeling Act" by its supporters but is known by its opponents
under the less-than-subtle name "Deny Americans the Right to Know" or
"DARK" Act." When H.R. 1599 came before the Senate, they read it twice
and then referred it to the Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and For-
estry.1 2 This referral will likely halt the bill's progress severely since commit-
tees are not required to act on measures referred to them.13 Either the
committee will choose to review H.R. 1599 quickly, or the bill will die from
neglect.14 If the committee decides not to take any further action in reviewing
H.R. 1599, that will "kill" the bill much like a vote against it.15 In light of this
possibility, and because H.R. 1599 was referred on July 24, 2015,16 guidance
from the courts is likely the best immediate solution.
I. FACTS
Act 120 was signed on May 8, 2014, and will become enforceable on
July 1, 2016.17
It requires that "food [intended for human consumption] offered
for sale by a retailer" after the Act's effective date "be labeled as
produced entirely or in part from genetic engineering if it is a
product: (1) offered for retail sale in Vermont; and (2) entirely or
partially produced with genetic engineering."18
10. H.R. 1599, 114th Cong. (2015); Carey Gillam, House Passes Anti-GMO Label-
ing Law, REUTERS (Jul. 23, 2015, 4:52 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/
2015/07/23/us-usa-gmo-labeling-idUSKCNOPX17920150723.
11. Id.
12. H.R. 1599-Safe and Accurate Food Labeling Act of 2015, CONGRESS.COM,
https://www.congress.gov/bill/ 1l4th-congress/house-bill/1599/all-ac-
tions?overview=closed (last visited Jun. 9, 2016).
13. Stage 3: The Bill Goes to Committee, LEXISNEXIS.COM, http://
www.lexisnexis.com/help/CU/TheLegislative-Process/Stage-3.htm (last vis-




17. Grocery Mfrs. Ass'n v. Sorrell, 102 F. Supp. 3d 583, 594 (D. Vt. 2015).
18. Id.
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Act 120 has many components, each of which is essential to understanding
the court's rationale in this case. Two provisions are particularly critical in
the court's opinion.19
The first critical provision in Act 120 is the "disclosure requirement,"20
which dictates "packaged raw agricultural commodity [ies]" be labeled by GE
manufacturers "with the clear and conspicuous words 'produced with genetic
engineering.-"21 The second critical provision of Act 120 prohibits GE food
manufacturers from using labeling, advertising, or signage indicating that a
GE food product is "'natural,' 'naturally made,' 'naturally grown,' 'all natu-
ral,' or any words of similar import that would have a tendency to mislead a
consumer."22 These definitions are known as the Act's "'natural' restric-
tion,"23 although Act 120 does not define the term "natural" or the phrase
"any words of similar import." 24 Plaintiff trade associations attack both of
these provisions, as well as the enforcement of the statute in its entirety,
based on free speech, preemption, and Commerce Clause theories.25
II. DESCRIPTION OF PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS
The court addressed each of the Plaintiffs' claims in turn, partially in
light of a document the Attorney General filed during the pendency of this
case, "The Final Rule."26 The Final Rule purports to clarify the scope of Act
120 and includes many definitions the original Act does not.2 7 In particular,
the Final Rule ostensibly narrows the Act's "natural" restriction by stating
that the phrase "'[n]atural or any words of similar import' means the words
nature, natural, or naturally."28 Plaintiffs objected to the Final Rule's retroac-
tive "clarification" because they contended, such amendments are unlawful.29
Plaintiffs assert that only the Vermont General Assembly may correct Act
120's constitutional deficiencies.30 The court acknowledged, but did not re-
solve, the disputed admissibility of this "clarification" of Act 120; it permited
19. Id.
20. Id. at 595.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 596.
23. Grocery Mfrs. Ass'n, 102 F. Supp. 3d at 596.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 594.
26. Id. at 602.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 602.
29. See Grocery Mfrs. Ass'n, 102 F. Supp. 3d at 603.
30. Id.
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the parties to submit supplemental briefings on the issue but does not address
the Rule's validity.31
Plaintiffs filed five constitutional claims against Act 120:32
* Count One (1) challenged the "disclosure requirement" under the
First Amendment because it compels manufacturers to use labels
that do not accurately describe their products, resulting in consumer
confusion and fear;33
* Count Two (2) raised a First Amendment challenge for the "'natu-
ral' restriction" because labeling GE foods as "natural" is not mis-
leading and prohibiting manufacturers from using these words is
unconstitutional;34
* Count Three (3) asserted that the Act's "'natural' restriction" is im-
permissibly vague in violation of the First and Fifth Amendments
because Act 120 does not define "any words of similar import;"35
* Count Four (4) challenged the Act as violating the Commerce
Clause;36 and
* Count Five (5) asserts that Act 120 is preempted by numerous fed-
eral statutes.37
Although there are numerous areas of discussion in the court's opinion,
this note primarily addresses the court's general rationale regarding the two
most critical provisions of Act 120.38 Additionally, because Count (5) is
likely moot in light of H.R. 1599,39 this note only examines Counts (1)
through (4).
III. PROCEDURAL AND SUBSTANTIVE HISTORY
The District Court held that some of Plaintiffs' claims were sufficient to
establish plausible constitutional violations but dismissed the rest.40 The
court also held the Plaintiffs would not suffer irreparable harm absent entry
of a preliminary injunction against the enforcement of Act 120.41 Addition-
ally, because the Plaintiffs failed to request an evidentiary hearing or a con-
31. Id.
32. Id. at 595.
33. Id. at 621.
34. Id. at 636.
35. Grocery Mfrs. Ass'n, 102 F. Supp. 3d at 642.
36. Id. at 648.
37. Id. at 610.
38. The disclosure requirement and the natural restriction. Id. at 594.
39. Gillam, supra note 10.
40. Grocery Mfrs. Ass'n, 102 F. Supp. 3d at 647.
41. Id.
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solidation with the merits,42 the opinion did not provide the guidance that
Plaintiffs likely sought, as the court was confined solely to the factual and
procedural background presented by the parties.43 The most significant con-
sequence of this procedural obstacle was the court's inability to answer the
question underlying all GE controversies: that "genetically engineered foods
potentially pose risks to health, safety, agriculture, and the environment."44
The gravity of this unanswered question is significant. Had the court been
able to give an answer, the issue central to the GE controversy would be
moot.
IV. COURT OF APPEAL HOLDING
Plaintiffs have appealed this case to the Second Circuit.45 However, con-
sidering the pendency of the Safe and Accurate Food Labeling Act (or
DARK Act, depending on whom you ask), this issue may become moot, as
H.R. 1599 will preempt Act 120 if it passes the Senate.46 Assuming, argu-
endo, that the pending bill does not pass, however, the case will proceed to
the Second Circuit. This court primarily consists of Democratic appointees,47
and as most Democrats emphatically support mandatory labeling of GE
food,48 the future of this case may be predictable even without the passage of
H.R. 1599.
V. COURT'S RATIONALE
The Vermont District Court's opinion ultimately approved of the Act's
"disclosure requirement" but was less favorable to its "'natural' restric-
tion."49 The court did not explicitly state why the first provision is preferable
to the second, but it is likely due to the inherently different action each re-
quires. The "disclosure requirement" compels GE manufacturers to provide
42. Id. at 599.
43. Id.
44. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
45. Grocery Mfrs. Ass'n, 102 F. Supp. 3d 583, appeal docketed, No. 15-1504 (2d
Cir. May 6, 2015).
46. Gillam, supra note 10.
47. United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, BALLOTPEDIA, http://
ballotpedia.org/United StatesCourt ofAppeals-for theSecondCircuit (last
visited Jun. 9, 2016).
48. Liberty Equality Fraternity and Trees, Which Democrats Just Voted Against
GMO Labeling?, DAILY Kos (May 23, 2013, 11:09 AM), http://
www.dailykos.com/story/2013/05/23/1211190/-Which-Democrats-Just-Voted-
Against-GMO-Labeling.
49. Grocery Mfrs. Ass'n, 102 F. Supp. 3d at 636, 642.
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information to consumers,50 whereas the "'natural' restriction" explicitly
prohibits speech.5'
A. Count (1): Whether Act 120's "Disclosure Requirement" violates
the First Amendment
Plaintiffs claim that "Act 120 requires manufacturers to use their labels
to convey an opinion with which they disagree, and that the State does not
purport to endorse: namely, that consumers should assign significance to the
fact that a product contains an ingredient derived from a genetically engi-
neered plant."52 The court does not address the substance of this claim; in-
stead, it reasons that forced speech is preferable to forbidden speech.53 The
court bases its rationale on the Supreme Court's holding that "there are 'ma-
terial differences between disclosure requirements and outright prohibitions
on speech."54 The court also noted "First Amendment protection for com-
mercial speech is justified in large part by the information's value to consum-
ers."55 Accordingly, the "constitutionally protected interest in not providing
. . . factual information is 'minimal."'56 Despite the fact that the court's ratio-
nale presupposes the "opinion" with which the Plaintiffs "disagree,"57 the
court adamantly endorses the disclosure of GE-related information to
consumers.
58
B. Count (2): Whether Act 120's "'Natural' Restriction" violates the
First Amendment
The court was much less favorable towards Act 120's "'natural' restric-
tion."59 This provision prohibits GE food manufacturers "from labeling or
advertising GE foods as 'natural,' 'naturally made,' 'naturally grown,' 'all
natural,' or 'any words of similar import."60 The court found the enforce-
50. Id. at 621-22.
51. Id. at 636.
52. Id. at 621-22 (emphasis added).
53. See id. at 639.
54. Id. at 621 (quoting Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of Sup. Ct. of
Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 650 (1985)).
55. Grocery Mfrs. Ass'n, 102 F. Supp. 3d at 632 (quoting Milavetz, Gallop & Mi-
lavetz, P.A. v. United States, 559 U.S. 229, 249-50 (2010)).
56. Id.
57. Id. at 621.
58. Id. at 632 (referencing 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 501
(1996) (plurality opinion)).
59. Id. at 642.
60. Id. at 594.
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ment of Act 120's "'natural' restriction" turns on how "natural" is defined.61
It assumed, arguendo, that the word "natural" in conjunction with GE foods
is misleading62 but ultimately found that the "'natural' restriction" was not
directly related to, or likely to advance, any state interest.63
C. Count (3): Whether Act 120's "'Natural' Restriction" is
Impermissibly Vague
The Plaintiffs' claim is that Act 120 does not define what "words of
similar import" are and is not permissible on product packaging.64 The court
warns that this definitional deficiency will "permit arbitrary and irrational
enforcement as it provides no meaningful standard for determining which
words will trigger liability."65 Thus, the court explained, the "'natural' re-
striction" will inconsistently penalize GE food manufacturers that use adver-
tising terms that are "susceptible to more than one interpretation."66
Additionally, the court noted that neither Act 120 nor the Final Rule defines
"'natural,' 'naturally made,' 'naturally grown,' [or] 'all natural.'"67 Accord-
ingly, the court observed that the State faces an uphill battle in arguing that a
GE food manufacturer's use of "'natural' terminology is actually or inher-
ently misleading because the alleged deception cannot be measured against a
statutory, or even a regulatory, definition of the restricted terms."68 The court
ultimately concluded that the "'natural restriction' [ ] subjects GE manufac-
turers to a standardless restriction that virtually no food manufacturer could
satisfy."69
D. Count (4): Whether Act 120 violates the Commerce Clause
Plaintiffs also claim that Act 120 violates the Commerce Clause.70 The
court notes three possible ways a law may violate the Commerce Clause by
discriminating against interstate commerce: "(1) by discriminating against in-
terstate commerce on its face; (2) by harboring a discriminatory purpose; or
61. Grocery Mfrs. Ass'n, 102 F. Supp. 3d at 639.
62. Id.
63. Id.; see Safelite Grp., Inc. v. Jepsen, 764 F.3d 258, 264 (2d Cir. 2014); Alexan-
der v. Cahill, 598 F.3d 79, 90 (2d Cir. 2010).
64. Grocery Mfrs. Ass'n, 102 F. Supp. 3d at 643.
65. Id. at 644.
66. Id. at 640 (quoting Alexander, 598 F.3d at 90).
67. Id. at 637.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 638.
70. Grocery Mfrs. Ass'n, 102 F. Supp. 3d at 605.
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(3) by discriminating in its effect."71 The court found that, although the law
did not discriminate in either of the first two ways, the third way was plausi-
ble because Act 120's "'natural' restriction" was "[w]ithout limitation and
for no stated purpose."72 The court reached this conclusion in large part be-
cause, under Act 120, GE food manufacturers are prohibited from using cer-
tain signage and advertising "regardless of where or how those activities take
place."73 Thus, the court found that Plaintiffs' allegations were "sufficient to
state a plausible per se violation of the Commerce Clause based upon its
discriminatory effects."74
VI. CRITIQUE OF THE COURT'S APPROACH
Although the court acknowledges the limited scope of its opinion,75 it
nonetheless misses potential opportunities to provide much-needed guidance
on such controversial issues. For instance, the court summarily concludes
that Act 120 does not violate the Commerce Clause, "even though interstate
commerce may be affected."76 The court does not explain this conclusion,
however, and thus provides no standard by which to determine how much
interstate commerce is "enough" to bring the Commerce Clause into effect.77
The court also notes that courts are "particularly hesitant to interfere with the
[state's consumer protection] efforts," because that area of the law is tradi-
tionally under state control.78 Instead of merely warning against judicial ac-
tivism, the court could have specified the limits of the doctrines. Without
such guidance, Act 120 may "permit arbitrary and irrational enforcement."79
Another deficiency in the court's analysis is its statement on (or rather
mention of) the risk of a "patchwork of state labeling requirements."80 Plain-
tiffs raised the possibility of adverse effects on the competitive market
caused by the likelihood of inconsistent food-labeling laws among the
states.8 The court dismisses this concern as merely "potential" instead of
71. Id. at 604 (quoting Town of Southold v. Town of E. Hampton, 477 F.3d 38, 48
(2d Cir. 2007)).
72. Id. at 607.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 599 ("[T]he court is . . . confined to the factual and procedural back-
ground set forth herein .... ).
76. Grocery Mfrs. Ass'n, 102 F. Supp. 3d at 604 (quoting Maine v. Taylor, 477
U.S. 131, 138 (1986)).
77. Id. at 604.
78. Id. (quoting SPGGC, LLC v. Blumenthal, 505 F.3d 183, 194 (2d Cir. 2007)).
79. Id. at 644.
80. Id. at 609.
81. Id.
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proactively addressing the issue. 82 It seems the court would rather wait until
disparate state food labeling laws are passed before it considers how to re-
solve this disparity.83 In an area in which the country clearly needs guidance,
judicial resolution of such issues is vitally important. Even if such guidance
were mere dicta, the benefit of any direction (albeit implicit) to others who
face issues with state food labeling laws would be invaluable. As the contro-
versy surrounding GE foods continues,8 4 and as H.R. 1599 currently awaits
Senate review, 85 any guidance could make a difference.
Furthermore, for a court opinion that so drastically impacts commerce,
both in Vermont and out-of-state, it is woefully silent on the topic of com-
merce itself. The court did not discuss any potential deterrent effect that
mandatory labeling laws may have on out-of-state manufacturers who may
be reluctant to do business in Vermont as a result of Act 120,86 nor did the
court address concerns that such laws may impact manufacturers' liveli-
hoods, the pursuit of which is recognized as a constitutional right.87 Further-
more, the court did not address the fact that this law impacts not only
manufacturers, but retailers of food products as well.88 The court did not
seem to consider any possible effects this law may have on regional, or pos-
sibly national, grocery store chains.89 Act 120 requires retailers in Vermont
to label shelves on which genetically modified food will sit.90 This will pre-
sumably affect consumer choices and may affect sales in the Vermont loca-
tions. The only recourse in such a situation is raising prices of the food itself,
which may cause potential price regulation difficulties chain-wide.91
82. Grocery Mfrs. Ass'n, 102 F. Supp. 3d at 609.
83. See id.
84. See Genetically Modified Food, supra note 1.
85. H.R. 1599.
86. See, e.g., Robinson v. Huerta, CV 14-0451 (RC), 2015 WL 5011411, at *8
(D.D.C. Aug. 24, 2015) (quoting Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114, 121
(1889)) ("It is undoubtedly the right of every citizen of the United States to
follow any lawful calling, business, or profession he may choose .
87. See id.
88. Grocery Mfrs. Ass'n, 102 F. Supp. 3d at 594.
89. See, e.g., Wilson Ring, Vermont's GMO Labeling Law Could Cost Grocers Up
To $10 Million per Day in Fines, Bus. INSIDER (Jun. 18, 2015, 10:46 PM),
http://www.businessinsider.com/vermonts-gmo-labeling-law-could-cost-gro
cers-up-to-10-million-per-day-in-fines-2015-6.
90. Grocery Mfrs. Ass'n, 102 F. Supp. 3d at 595.
91. See Michelle Ye Hee Lee, Would GMO Labeling Requirement Cost $500 More
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The most troublesome, and unfortunately most ambiguous, issue in this
court's opinion is that the "disclosure requirement" compels speech that
presumes the truth of Defendants' claims: that there is a measurable differ-
ence between GE and "natural" foods.92 As declared by the Vermont General
Assembly, Act 120's purpose is, in part, to "[e]stablish a system by which
. . . persons may avoid potential health risks of food produced from genetic
engineering."93 This claim has been neither proven nor negated, but the re-
quirement of different labeling rules arguably presumes that it has been
proven.94
Although the court recognizes that there are "material differences be-
tween disclosure requirements and outright prohibitions on speech"95 and
that forcing speech that is only factual does not violate the First Amend-
ment, 96 it misses a step in its analysis. The statement that a food product is
genetically engineered may itself sound like a "fact," but if the statement is
based on something that has not been proven, is it factual? The court does not
address this question and merely dismisses the claim because food-labeling
does not neatly fit within the definition of an "opinion."97 Moreover, the
court concludes that the compelled speech is not controversial enough to vio-
late the First Amendment.98
This case ensures that state laws regarding food-labeling will remain
inconsistent (unless, of course, H.R. 1599 is passed) and that consumers will
still not know whether GE food poses health risks.99 Given that the scientific
conclusions about GE food are widely varied and hotly contested,oo perhaps
the courts should step in and provide guidance. This court's holding may be
moot if H.R. 1599 becomes lawIo1-but otherwise, consumers, manufactur-
ers, and retailers will remain unsure of how to proceed.
92. Grocery Mfrs. Ass'n, 102 F. Supp. 3d at 595.
93. Id. at 598.
94. See Carole Bartolotto, Genetically-Modified Organisms (GMOs) Have NOT
Been Proven Safe, HUFFINGTON PosT (Jul. 24, 2014, 5:21 PM), http://
www.huffingtonpost.com/carole-bartolotto/have-genetically-modified-b559
7751.html.
95. Grocery Mfrs. Ass'n, 102 F. Supp. 3d at 621 (quoting Zauderer v. Office of
Disciplinary Counsel of Sup. Ct. of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 650 (1985)).
96. Id. at 626.
97. Id. at 629.
98. Id. at 630.
99. See id. at 600.
100. See Genetically Modified Food, supra note 1, at 1.
101. Gillam, supra note 10.
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VII. OVERVIEW OF THE CRITIQUE
This case addresses a law that requires special labels for genetically
modified food but, unfortunately, leaves many questions unanswered.102
Laws like Act 120 are controversial in many states because of disputed safety
and commercial claims.103 Thus, laws such as these will continue to raise
many concerns, including discrimination, free speech, preemption issues,
and whether the law is designed to protect the health and safety of the public
at large, as opposed to an improper purpose. 04 Moreover, even if these laws
do pursue a proper purpose, significant concerns exist about whether the re-
quirements of these laws are reasonably related to their purported legislative
purpose. 0 5
This case clearly reflects the fact that GE foods have not been conclu-
sively proven dangerous to public health.106 However, this case illustrates
that there is both a need (however disputed) and a resistance to regulate ge-
netically modified food. Ironically, the Plaintiffs' pleading in this case de-
prived the court of a crucial opportunity to provide some much-needed
direction on these issues. We can only hope that next time plaintiffs will ask
for the guidance that the public needs and deserves.
102. § 3043.
103. Genetically Modified Food, supra note 1, at 1.
104. See Grocery Mfrs. Ass'n, 102 F. Supp. 3d at 639.
105. See id. at 635 (quoting Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of Sup. Ct.
of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 650).
106. See Bartolotto, supra note 94.
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